

*Should SE 34
been mentioned
in throat not.*

[Redacted]

on 791

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

3 March 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Allan Evans (OIR)
Colonel Gerald F. Lillard, USA (G-2)
Captain Allan L. Reed, USN (ONI)
Colonel Jack E. Thomas, USAF (AFOIN-2B)
Captain John A. Holbrook, USN (JIG)

SUBJECT : Post Mortems

ENCLOSURE : Draft Post Mortems Section for Incorporation
in a Subsequent IAC Progress Report

1. In the last IAC Progress Report (IAC-PR-30, dated 21 January), we included as item 25, a section on post mortems. This seems to us a useful way in which to incorporate in an official IAC paper the results of post mortem proceedings.

2. We submit herewith for your consideration draft paragraphs for incorporation in the next IAC Progress Report, together with a general statement which obviates the need for any special call for action in the particular case (as was done in item 25 b of IAC-PR-30 for example).

3. Could you please let me know by Friday, 6 March:

a. If you agree that the summary findings ought to be included in the IAC Progress Report; and,

b. If you concur in the draft statements of findings for the estimates covered in this report; namely, SE-34, NIE-70, and NIE-75/1.

4. We have also reviewed SE-28/1, "Probable Consequences of the Anti-Trust Suit Against Certain US Oil Companies", and

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SE-32, "Consequences of Communist Control over South Asia".
In our view, no post mortem action by the IAC agencies is called
for.

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Deputy Assistant Director (Adm.)
National Estimates

Distribution "B"

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Draft Post Mortems Section for
Incorporation in a Subsequent
IAC Progress Report

The findings of the IAC representatives, who have reviewed the estimates listed below for intelligence deficiencies revealed during their preparation, are included herein for information and appropriate action by IAC research and collection activities.

a. SE-34 :

30 December 1952.

Findings: The critical paragraphs of this estimate were questions of judgment rather than of fact. This underlines the standing requirement for ascertaining the general attitudes of other governments.

b. NIE-70 : Conditions and Trends in Latin America
Affecting US Security, published 12 December 1952.

Findings: Most of the data needed was available from open sources. The purpose of the estimate was to present a highly generalized interpretation of conditions and trends in the area; the intelligence problem was largely one of analysis. There is nevertheless need for continuing collection and research efforts directed at:

- (1) The economic and social conditions which contribute to political instability, extreme nationalism, and Yankeeophobia;
- (2) Further development of the trend toward demagogic, nationalistic regimes;
- (3) The policies and interrelationships of such regimes; and
- (4) Communist efforts to penetrate national governments or to influence their policy.

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g. NIE-75/1*: Probable Developments in Iran through 1953,
published 9 January 1953.



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note is $\pm$ our
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Principal gaps are:—
These continue to be
Principal Intell.
targets in
Iran.*

* Note: Superseded NIE-75, published 13 November 1952, which was identical except for minor differences in the conclusions. These findings are also applicable to a previous estimate prepared on "crash" basis in



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